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This paper derives a New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium
model with liquidity constrained consumers and sticky prices. The
model allows a role for both government spending and taxation in the
DGE model. The model is then estimated using Euro area data. We
demonstrate that there seems to be a signiﬁcant role for rule-of-thumb
consumer behaviour. Our model is then used to analyse the interaction
between ﬁscal and monetary policies. We examine the extent to which
ﬁscal policy (automatic stabilisers) assist or hinder monetary policy
when the latter takes a standard forward-looking inﬂation targeting
form. We also examine the extent to which inertia in ﬁscal policy and
the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers aﬀects output and inﬂation
variability in the presence of such a monetary policy rule.
JEL Codes: E58, E62, E63
11 Introduction
Despite the existence of a vast literature on the robustness and optimality of
monetary policy rules, relatively little attention has been given to the issue of
monetary-ﬁscal policy interactions. A number of papers have examined the
interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary policies using New Keynesian
dynamic general equilibrium models1, or game-theoretic models2, but none of
these models have been tested empirically, with the exception of Muscatelli et
al. (2003). In this paper we estimate a small econometric model for the Euro
area over the sample period 1970-1998, and analyse the performance of mon-
etary rules in the presence of ﬁscal stabilizers. While the structural model
used in this paper has many elements in common with other New Keynesian
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, our analysis diﬀers
in many aspects. First, we extend some current DSGE models to include
aw i d e rr a n g eo fﬁscal policy transmission channels. Second, our model is
estimated, in contrast to some attempts to calibrate or numerically simulate
these models. Third, the focus of our paper is on the way in which inertial
policy rules interact with inertia in the structural model due to the presence
of non-optimising consumers and ﬁrms. Finally, we also examine the behav-
ior of ﬁscal policies in a basic two-country version of our Euro-area model,
in the presence of a monetary union.
Conventional New Keynesian DSGE models (as discussed for instance in
Galí, 2003) typically provide a very limited role for ﬁscal policy. The standard
forward-looking IS curve is based on the assumption of "Ricardian" forward-
looking consumers, who have full access to complete ﬁnancial markets. This
assumption is contradicted by the empirical evidence on the permanent in-
come hypothesis which supports the view that a signiﬁcant proportion of
consumers are non-Ricardian. Moreover, conventional DSGE models can-
not rationalize the positive response of consumption to public expenditure
shocks. To account for these eﬀects, we adopt the innovation proposed by
Galí et al. (2002), who assume that a fraction of households are constrained
to consume out of current income. By doing so, we are also able to model
the demand eﬀect of other ﬁscal variables, i.e. taxes and transfers. On the
1See for example Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001), Be-
nigno and Woodford (2003) for an analysis of ﬁscal and monetary interactions in theoret-
ical models. Perez and Hiebert (2002) and Zagaglia (2002) have experimented with DGE
model simulations which include some ﬁscal closure rules.
2See Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2001).
2supply side of the economy, to our knowledge existing empirical New Key-
nesian DSGE models neglect ﬁscal distortions. In this paper we make a ﬁrst
attempt at estimating the empirical eﬀect of the tax wedge on the Phillips
curve in New Keynesian DSGE models.
We use our estimated model to undertake a number of dynamic simu-
lations, examining the responses of the endogenous variables (including the
policy instruments) to unanticipated structural and policy shocks.
Finally, we conduct some policy analysis with our estimated models. This
allows us to consider whether the introduction of endogenous ﬁscal policy
rules markedly changes the performance of the monetary policy rule. Earlier
contributions (Muscatelli et al., 2003) had found that countercyclical ﬁscal
policy can be welfare-reducing in the presence of optimizing monetary policy-
makers. In contrast to this evidence, by introducing a role for taxation in the
DSGE model, we ﬁnd that automatic stabilizers based on taxation tend to
be more eﬃcient than those based on government spending. We also analyze
the impact of inertia (persistence) in the ﬁscal rule and in the structural
model on the performance of the monetary and ﬁscal policy rules, and ﬁnd
that inertial taxation rules tend to be more eﬃcient than inertial government
expenditure rules. Finally we conﬁrm the results in Galí et al. (2003) that
the presence of rule of thumb consumers tends to create more instability in
the model (by increasing the variability of output and inﬂation following an
inﬂation shock), but also ﬁnd that automatic stabilizers based on taxation
tend to oﬀset the impact of rule-of-thumb consumers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we brieﬂy
survey the existing literature. In Section 3, we outline the structure of our
estimated model and the empirical methodology. In Section 4, we report
our estimates and examine some dynamic simulations from our estimated
models, whereas in Section 5 we examine the performance and interaction of
the monetary and ﬁscal policy rules. In section 6 we present a two country
model for monetary and ﬁscal policies interections. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Existing Literature
Much of the literature on ﬁscal-monetary policy interactions has focused
on whether monetary and ﬁscal policy operate as strategic complements or
substitutes. Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2001) explore the interdependence
between the ﬁscal authority and the central bank in a model where the latter
3has only partial control over inﬂation, which is also directly aﬀected by the
ﬁscal policy stance. They show that in equilibrium the two policy rules are
complements when ﬁscal expansions have non-Keynesian (contractionary)
eﬀects on output and inﬂation. Buti, Roeger and in’t Veld (2001) suggest that
the speciﬁc form of interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary policies,
i.e. the alternative between strategic substitutability and complementarity,
should not necessarily be interpreted in terms of conﬂict or cooperation, and
might be shock-dependent. In their model supply shocks unambiguously
induce conﬂicting policies, whereas the opposite occurs for demand shocks.
Empirical contributions in this area are mainly based on panel data tech-
niques and VAR analyses. Cross-sectional or panel data examine the rela-
tionship between ﬁscal and monetary policies over the cycle. Work by Mélitz
(1997, 2000) and Wyplosz (1999) broadly supports the view that the two poli-
cies have acted as strategic substitutes over the last 2-3 decades. Von Hagen,
Hughes-Hallett and Strauch (2001) ﬁnd that the interdependence between
t h et w op o l i c y m a k e r si sa s y m m e t r i c :l o o s e rﬁscal stances match monetary
contractions, whereas monetary policies broadly accommodate ﬁscal expan-
sions. Muscatelli et al. (2001) examine the interaction between ﬁscal and
monetary policy instruments using conventional VAR and Bayesian VAR
models for several G7 economies, and show that the ﬁscal shocks identiﬁed
in the VAR have a signiﬁcant impact3.T h e yﬁnd that the result of strategic
substitutability does not hold uniformly for all countries. Moreover, they
report strong evidence that the linkage between ﬁscal and monetary policy
has shifted post-1980, when ﬁscal and monetary policies became much more
complementary. The main problem with this empirical literature is that
without a structural model it is diﬃcult to interpret the empirical correla-
tions between the two policy variables. In the work of Mélitz (1997, 2000)
and Wyplosz (1999) one cannot tell whether the correlation between the pol-
icy instruments over the cycle derives from systematic policy responses or
from responses to structural or policy shocks. In the VARs estimated by
Muscatelli et al. (2001) the focus is on the reaction of policy instruments to
other policy shocks, but it is notoriously diﬃcult to interpret implicit policy
reaction functions in VARs especially if the ’true’ underlying structural model
is forward-looking. More recently, Muscatelli et al. (2003) examine the in-
3The number of contributions applying VAR techniques is still limited. This may be
due to the critique in Mountford and Uhlig (2002) that true ﬁscal policy surprises may be
diﬃcult to detect in a VAR model.
4teraction of monetary and ﬁscal policies using an estimated New Keynesian
dynamic general equilibrium model for the US. In contrast to earlier work
they show that the strategic complementarity or substitutability of ﬁscal and
monetary policy depends crucially on the types of shocks hitting the econ-
omy, and on the assumptions made about the underlying structural model.
The greater complementarity of ﬁscal and monetary policy seen in the 1990s
compared to the 1980s was due to the changing nature of the underlying
shocks.
Our focus in this paper is diﬀerent. We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE
model which, in contrast to our earlier work and other attempts to estimate
structural New Keynesian models4, allows for a richer range of transmission
channels for ﬁscal policy, whilst still maintaining a model where the struc-
tural parameters are estimated using econometrics. This model is then used
to conduct policy analysis to see how ﬁscal and monetary policy interact
and what implications the degree of inertia in the structural model and in
the policy rules has for monetary and ﬁscal policy design. The introduc-
tion of central bank independence in most of the industrialized economies
has raised the issue of whether ﬁscal and monetary policies are properly co-
ordinated. One motivation for this paper is to show that ﬁscal stabilizers,
which can be shown to be counterproductive in standard DSGE models (e.g.
Muscatelli et al., 2003)5 signiﬁcantly improve welfare in an economy charac-
terized by an important proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers. In partic-
ular, taxation rules based on automatic stabilisers can be shown to have a
welfare-enhancing eﬀect. Our results are complementary to those obtained
using diﬀerent frameworks by other researchers. Gordon and Leeper (2003),
using a calibrated model for the US economy, ﬁnd that ﬁscal stabilization
policies tends to destabilize the business cycle because of their impact on
debt service obligations. Jones (2002) uses an estimated stochastic growth
model (without price stickiness) for the US to show that ﬁscal policy had
limited stabilization eﬀects in the post-war period.
4See Gali et al. (2001), Leith and Malley (2002), Smets and Wouters (2002).
5In Muscatelli et al. (2003) our ﬁscal rules are estimated and we do not examine
alternative forms for these rules. In that paper we show that countercyclical ﬁscal policy
can be welfare-reducing if ﬁscal and monetary policy rules are inertial and not co-ordinated.
Our conjecture in that paper was that this surprising result was probably due to the
interaction of highly inertial estimated monetary and ﬁscal policy rules. In this paper we
study ﬁscal policy rules in a DSGE model which involves a richer range of ﬁscal channels.
53 A New-Keynesian Structural Model
We use a small forward-looking New Keynesian DSGE model, comprising
a dynamic IS equation for output and a “New Keynesian Phillips Curve”
speciﬁcation for inﬂation.
3.1 Households
We assume two types of households. Households in the ﬁrst group, i,b e n e ﬁt
from full access to the capital markets and as such are free to optimize.
The proportion of optimising consumers in the economy is given by (1 −ϑ).


























t represents consumption of a basket of goods (to be deﬁned below),
Ht is an index of external habits and No
t is the level of employment. β ∈ (0,1)
represents the subjective rate of time preference, ρ the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion, ϕ the inverse of the elasticity of labour supply with respect
to real wage and εl
t is a shock to labour supply. Finally, Et denotes the
expectation operator conditional on the time t information set. Following
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Optimizing consumers maximize (1) subject to their intertemporal budget
constraint, which is expressed in real terms as:
(1/rt)a
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Accordingly, consumers hold their ﬁnancial wealth (at)i nt h ef o r mo fo n e -
period state-contingent securities, which yield a return of rt.T h eo p t i m i z i n g
consumer’s disposable income consists of labour income wtNoi
t plus the div-
idends from the proﬁts of the imperfectly competitive ﬁrms Di
t, plus public
transfers GTRi
t minus personal taxes Ti
t, lump-sum by assumption.
6As in Galí et al. (2002) we assume that a proportion ϑ of households
follow a rule of thumb and consume out of current disposable income. This
admittedly ad hoc assumption may be justiﬁed assuming myopia or limited
participation to capital markets. We also assume that rule-of-thumb con-
sumers supply a constant amount of labour6, NRT. Thus, the consumption
function of the representative rule-of-thumb consumer amounts to:
C
RTj












Total consumption is given by a standard CES function of imperfectly



















where the constant elasticity of substitution, θ, between diﬀerentaited goods
is assumed greater than one. Solving the intratemporal optimal allocation












where Pt(z) is the price of good z,a n dPt is the consumption price index














In the model economy there is a continuum of ﬁrms, indexed by z ∈ [0,1],
acting as monopolistic competitors. Firms dispose the following simple Cobb-






, levied on rule-of-thumb consumers are always nil. This result
would never obtain in our model, where taxes and transfers are explicitly modeled. Thus,
for sake of simplicity we assume a constant labour supply. Since consumption cannot be





for any given level of
the real wage.
7Douglas function of labour for each consumption good variety z:
Yt(z)=At(Nt(z))
1−α (8)
We introduce ﬁscal distortions by assuming that taxes on labour take














Nt ,w h e r e
TPR
t is the total revenues from the payroll tax.
T u r n i n gn e x tt ot h em o d e lo fﬁrms’ pricing behavior, we consider a stan-
dard model of monopolistic competition with sticky prices, as set out in Galí,
Gertler and López-Salido (2001), and Leith and Malley (2002)8.M o r ep r e -
cisely, sticky prices are incorporated into this model by assuming a Calvo pric-
ing mechanism whereby only a given proportion of ﬁrms, deﬁned as (1 − ξ),
can adjust prices every period whereas the remainder supplies output on
demand, at a constant price. A share γ of the adjusting ﬁr m si sa s s u m e d
to index prices to inﬂa t i o ni nt h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d 9, while the remaininder,
(1−γ), set their prices optimally to maximize expected discounted real prof-
its10, with a discount factor β.
3.3 The IS and the Phillips curve
By log-linearizing the model around the deterministic steady state we are
then able to derive a hybrid dynamic equation for output and the New Key-
nesian Phillips curve (see the Appendix for a proof)11. In what follows “hat-
7This implies that the optimizing consumer’s choice between leisure and consumption
is not aﬀected.
8See also Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), and Sbordone (2002).
9This was pioneered by Galí and Gertler (1999). Similar backward-looking elements
can be introduced to the NKPC equation by introducing indexation of all non-re-optimised
prices (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2001, and Woodford, 2002, chapter 3).
10A similar speciﬁcation for the New Keynesian Phillips curve can be obtained by making
the indexation process part of the optimisation process (see Smets and Wouters, 2002).
11We ignore investment and the external sector. Arguably, the open-economy considera-
tions are less important to the USA, which is the focus of our analysis here. The extension
of our modeling approach to the open economy is left to further work.
8ted” lower-case variables represent percentage deviations from the steady
state whereas “barred” variables denote steady-state values.
The log linearized equation for output reads as:
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where aj,w i t hj =1 ,...,7, are function of structural parameters and steady
state ratios. In particular, they are given by:
a1 =[ 1+a7]















































b gt is government spending excluding government transfers d GTR.A tﬁrst sight
equation (10) looks very complex. In fact, by imposing no habit, λ =0 ,a n d
the absence of rule-of-thumb consumers, NRT
N = ϑ =0 , equation (10) col-
lapses to a purely forward looking IS curve. Note that consumption habit
introduces a link between current and past output (as in Carroll, 2000, Leith
and Malley, 2002; Smets and Wouters, 2002). Moreover, the presence of
non-optimizing consumers establishes a link between the demand for goods,
net personal taxes, d GTR− T, and the real wage. Fiscal policy impacts on
output in three ways. First, through the usual resource withdrawal eﬀect
of government consumption, b gt. Second, through the impact of net personal
taxes d GTR− T on the current disposable income of rule-of-thumb consumers.
Third, through the impact of payroll taxes TPRon the real wage of rule-of-
thumb consumers12. Finally, rule-of-thumb consumers weaken the impact of
interest rate policy on aggregate demand. As shown in Galì et al. (2003)
12From equations (4) and (9) it should be clear that, in each period, the equilibrium real
wage is inversely related to employment and the payroll tax. In the Appendix we explain
why the rate of change of these variables aﬀects current output.
9this may have important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. In-
deed, our estimates conﬁrm that rule-of-thumb consumers weaken the output
response to interest rate changes.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tw h i l s tg o v e r n m e n ts p e n d i n gi m p a c t so nt h e
consumption behaviour of optimising consumers via the resource-withdrawal
eﬀect, taxation impacts through its eﬀe c to nd i s p o s a b l ei n c o m ef o rr u l e -
of-thumb consumers, and hence via the external habit (total consumption)
variable. This ensures that government spending enters via a distributed
lag in (10) which sum to zero, while personal and payroll taxes enter in
diﬀerences, with coeﬃcients of diﬀerent size. As we shall see below, this
drives some of the results of the model.
Log-linearization of the ﬁrms’ optimal price, together with the assump-
tions about Calvo mechanism and indexation, leads to an expression for the
inﬂation rate that reads as (see the Appendix for details):
b πt =
γb πt−1 + βξEtb πt+1
ξ + γ(1 − ξ(1 − β))
+
(1 − γ)(1 − ξ)(1 − γξ)
[ξ + γ(1 − ξ(1 − β))][1 + (α/(1 − α))θ]
b st (11)
where b st i st h ep e r c e n t a g ec h a n g ef r o ms t e a d ys t a t eo ft h el a b o u rc o s ts h a r e ,
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Equations (10) and (11) constitute our structural model. It is important
to note that in estimating (11), we treat real wages and employment as
exogenous. Other recent contributions (Leith and Malley, 2002, Smets and
Wouters, 2002) estimate wage equations, and adding a wage equation would
have enabled us to consider the possibility of sticky wage dynamics. However,
this would have also added to the complexity of the model.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Data and Scope of the Study
13Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001) specify (10) in terms of average real marginal




10We now turn to the empirical results of the baseline model for the Euro
area14. While we provide estimates of the structural parameters present in
the IS curve (Eq.(10)), we use the estimates for the Phillips curve as reported
in Galí et al. (2001, 2003). All data from the European Central Bank (see
Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001)), are quarterly time series over the sample
period 1970(1)-1998(2). The data deﬁnitions used are reported in the Data
Appendix.
To capture the spirit of the NK models as log-linearizations, the data
are transformed so that the variables are expressed in deviations from the
“steady state”15. Both real and nominal variables are de-trended using the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smooth parameter set to 1600. Note that as
the inﬂation rate and interest rate always enter the model together, all the
equations are ’balanced’ in terms of the levels of integration of the dependent
and explanatory variables.16
4.2 Estimation Methods
The New Keynesian model consists of equations that are non-linear in param-
eters. Following Hansen (1982) a model with rational expectations suggests
some natural orthogonality restrictions that can be used in the generalized
methods of moments (GMM) framework. Each equation estimated using
GMM is of the form:
yit = fi(θi,zit)+uit (12)
where for each equation i, yit is the vector of dependent variables, θi is
the (ai × 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and zit is the
(ki × 1) vector of explanatory variables. The GMM approach is based on
the fact that e θi, the true value of θi, has the property E[hi( e θi,wit)] = 0,
where wit ≡ ( y0
it,z0
it,x0
it),a n dxit is an (ri × 1) vector of instruments that
are correlated with zit. GMM then chooses the estimate θi so as to make
the sample moment as close as possible to the population moment of zero.
The validity of these instruments can be tested for each equation by using
14The estimation was carried out using RATS, version 5.
15Which is commonplace in this literature (see Smets and Wouters, 2002, Leith and
Malley, 2002).
16T h eg o v e r n m e n ts p e n d i n gd a t a( G) is total government spending excluding transfers
and interest payments, whilst we use employers’ social security contributions as payroll
taxes (T∗), and government transfers minus personal taxes as (GTR− T).
11Hansen’s J-test, which is distributed as a χ2(ri − ai) statistic under the null
of valid orthogonality conditions.
GMM or IV estimation has been used by a number of authors to estimate
NK models17. One problem is that the estimated IS and NKPC equations
are highly nonlinear in parameters, and the rank condition for identiﬁcation
is not met unless a number of parameters in these two equations are ﬁxed.
To begin with, in estimating the output equation we impose that the steady-
state ratios are given by their average values computed over the sub-sample
period 1990(1)-1998(2).18 Results are reported in Table 1.
































0.62 0.16 0.503 0.353 0.121 0.260 1.353 −0.111
Furthermore, in order to increase the accuracy of the estimation we cali-
brate some structural parameters at values taken from other empirical stud-
ies. We impose the habit formation parameter on aggregate consumption to
be equal to unity (λ =1 )a n dt h ec o e ﬃcient of relative risk aversion to be
equal to two (ρ =2 ) .
4.3 Model Estimates
Table 2 reports the estimated New Keynesian model using GMM over the full
sample period. Standard errors for all the parameters estimates are reported
in brackets. Our vector of instruments xit include a constant plus de-trended
output, government spending exculding government transfers, direct tax per
worker, nominal exchange rate, wage rate, inﬂation rate and nominal interest
rate.
17For instance, Galì, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001), Leith and Malley (2002), Kara





/Y is simply equal to the labour share in equilibrium, which we set equal to
(1 −α)=0 .6. Furthermore, in computing the average value for GTR−T
Y we initially found
a positive number (0.102), for this reason we decided to set to zero GTR and obtain the
numebr reported in the Table above.
12In estimating the NK output equation we employed a two-step procedure.
F i r s to fa l l ,n o t et h a ti ti sp o s s i b l et ow r i t et h eI Sc u r v es ot oh a v et h eﬁrst
diﬀerence in expected real wage, ∆ˆ wt+1,i np l a c eo fa3Et {∆b nt+1} + a4∆b tPR
t+1






That being stated, one can estimate the reduced form of the IS equation(10)
and obtain a point estimate for the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers.
Using six lags of the above instruments, the structural parameter ϑ turns
out to be 0.505 with asymptotic standard error of 0.036.19 More precisely,
the estimated ϑ is computed by dividing the estimated coeﬃcient on ∆b tt+1
by the coeﬃcient on
n
b yt+1 − G
Y b gt+1
o
multiplied by -0.35.20 In the second
step of the estiamtion, we then re-estimate (10) having ﬁxed the values of ρ
and λ and the value ϑ from the ﬁrst step and ﬁnd structural estimates for
the parameters NRT/N and Co/C.
The overall ﬁt for the estimated equation is good: the R2 statistic for
(10) is 0.83. The Hansen statistic for overidentifying restrictionts test is
59.39, which is distributed as a χ2(41) under the null hypothesis of valid
instruments. The null hypothesis of valid instruments is not rejected at the
5% signiﬁcance level.
Our point estimates thus suggest that about 50% of consumers are rule-
of-thumb consumers, whilst 65% of total consumption in steady state is given
by optimising consumers. Rule-of-thumb consumers account for about 61%
of total employment. Point estimates of the Calvo parameter suggests that
about 84% of ﬁrms do not adjust their prices every period and of these about
30% simply index prices.





















Standard errors are reported in brackets.
19The standard error is been computed using the delta method.
20Note that from the ﬁrst-step estimation one can also obtain point estimates for NRT
N
and Co
C ,w h i c ha r eg i v e nb y0.604 and 0.778 respectively.
134.4 Dynamic and Stochastic Simulations
Having estimated our structural model, we now perform a number of dy-
namic simulation experiments to investigate the properties of this simple
New Keynesian model21 and the transmission mechanism of ﬁscal and mon-
etary policies.
We focus on the dynamic model solution, shocking each structural equa-
tion and policy equation in turn, to simulate the eﬀects of a structural or
policy variable shock on the other endogenous variables in the model. This
allows us to examine the properties of the model, and the response of out-
put and inﬂation to policy and structural shocks. Essentially this involves
simulating the model without any reference to actual data. The exogenous
variables in the model i.e. government transfers (GTR), the real wage ( d w − p)
and employment (b n), are simulated as follows: government transfers are sim-
ply assumed to be constant. We assume that nominal wages are indexed to
inﬂation with a one-period lag22,w h i l s te m p l o y m e n ti sd e t e r m i n e db yt h e
log-linearization of the production technology (8). To simulate the model,
we close it by adding a Taylor rule for short-run nominal interest rate. In
order to provide a baseline for an analysis of inertial rules below, we assume
a very simple type of forward-looking non-inertial Taylor rule:
b it =1 .5(Etb πt+1)+0 .5(b yt) (13)
Excluding inertia from this Taylor rule has the advantage of allowing us
to focus on the simulation properties of the structural model and on the
ﬁscal channels. The results of the dynamic model solution are shown in
Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3. These display the dynamic patterns of
output, inﬂation and the real interest rate in response to a temporary shock
to inﬂation equation. The initial shock is 1% and this then recedes with a
0.5 autoregressive parameter, and is set to zero after 4 quarters.
21The model is solved using Winsolve version 3.0 (see Pierse, 2000), which provides
numerical solutions for linear and non-linear rational expectations models. We solve our
model using the Stacked Newton method in Winsolve. In solving the models with struc-
tural shocks (and further below with policy shocks) these are treated as unanticipated by
economic agents.
22The absence of a wage-setting equation is less problematic than might seem at ﬁrst
sight. If one looks at US data from the 1990s, one can see that real wages and employment
were far less volatile around their trend during the 1990s. Thus the assumption that wages
simply respond to lagged inﬂation is not a major departure from reality.























15In the event of an inﬂation shock, the monetary authority responds by
engineering a reduction in inﬂation and a persistent adjustment pattern in
output. On impact, in fact, output jumps down to -0.15 and remains under
steady state for about eight quarters. Such time patterns for ˆ y and ˆ π occur
because of the persistent rise in the real interest rate, which remains above
steady state for about six quarters.
5 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions and
Policy Design
5.1 Monetary and Fiscal Rules
Having examined the dynamic properties of our estimated model, we now
turn to the issue of policy design. As noted above, the earlier literature on
monetary-ﬁscal interactions focused exclusively on understanding whether
monetary and ﬁscal policies have tended to act together over the cycle. A
more important issue is whether ﬁscal policies, and in particular the auto-
matic stabilizers considered here, actually assist or impede the eﬀorts of an
independent central bank which adopts a forward-looking inﬂation targeting
rule. More precisely, how should automatic stabilizers be designed in order
to ensure that monetary and ﬁscal policy act in concert, i.e. as strategic
complements?
In an earlier paper, Muscatelli et al. (2003), we presented evidence that
estimated ﬁscal policy rules for the US appeared to be welfare-reducing, which
seemed to accord with the evidence (using diﬀerent modeling approaches) in
Gordon and Leeper (2003) and Jones (2002). From the point of view of a
central bank adopting an optimal policy rule designed to minimize a standard
quadratic loss function in deviations of output, inﬂation and changes in the
policy instrument (the short run nominal interest rate), we are now able to re-
e x a m i n et h ei s s u ei nam o d e lw h e r eﬁscal policy may play a more important
role because rule-of-thumb consumers only indirectly react to the interest rate
rule23. Furthermore, the current model considers some additional channels
of transmission of ﬁscal policy: taxation eﬀects on consumption through
23As shown in Galì et al. (2003), rule-of-thumb consumers are aﬀected by interest rate
changes only to the extent that the real wage adjusts following the new labour conditions
determined by the optimising consumers’ reaction to such interest rate changes
16liquidity constrained consumers, and taxation wedge eﬀects on inﬂation, as
well as interaction eﬀects due to the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers.
In addition, instead of focusing on estimated ﬁscal rules we will consider a
more systematic analysis of diﬀerent rules for ﬁscal stabilizers.
5.1.1 Monetary Rule
Before turning to the issue of how one might design robust ﬁscal rules, let
us turn ﬁrst to monetary policy. In contrast to the numeros papers on the
behaviour of the Federal Reserve and other central banks, the empirical lit-
erature on the European Central Bank’s past behaviour seems instead at an
initial stage, mainly due to its short history. The monetary policy rule for the
nominal interest rateb it follows a form similar to the standard forward-looking
Taylor rule speciﬁcation which has become commonplace in the literature24
(see Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1998, 2000; Muscatelli et al. 2002; Giannoni
and Woodford, 2002a,b):
b it = φ1Etb πt+q + φ2b yt+s + φ3b it−1 (14)
where the rule also allows for an interest-rate smoothing component if φ3 6=0 .
In order to simulate monetary-ﬁscal policy interactions we use the esti-
mates reported in Sauer and Sturm (2003), which provide us with a bench-
mark against which to assess the performance of diﬀerent designs for auto-
matic ﬁscal stabilizers in our structural model.
5.1.2 Fiscal Rules
We consider a simple backward-looking format for our ﬁscal policy rules
(automatic stabilizers), following inter alia Van Den Noord (2000), Westaway
(2003) and Andres and Domenech (2003). This captures the more realistic
lagged response of ﬁscal policy to macroeconomic variables due to automatic
stabilizers:
b gt = δ1b gt−1 − δ2b yt−1 (15)
24The main diﬀerence is that we use a contemporaneous value of the output gap (see
Muscatelli et al. 2002) as opposed to expected future values, as in Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1998, 2000). For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Giannoni and Woodford
(2002a,b). For an alternative approach to modeling interest rate responses, involving
nonlinearities in reaction functions, see Cukierman and Muscatelli (2001).
17b τt = ϕ1b τt−1 + ϕ2b yt−1 (16)
where b τt is the vector of our two tax measures, personal taxes b tt and payroll
taxes, b tTR
t . Our taxation rule therefore imposes the same adjustment pattern
on both taxes, and does not look at how a mix of tax measures might improve
the design of policy25. The importance of the taxation policy mix is consid-
ered further below. Note that we do not allow for any feedback of policy to
budget deﬁcits or debt accumulation26. Recall that our models are estimated
using detrended data and focus on stabilization over the cycle rather than
the shifts in ﬁscal regimes which often accompany the correction of deﬁcits,
or debt-correction strategies. Our ﬁscal rules are largely capturing automatic
stabilizers through the autoregressive and the output gap terms.
For our baseline case, we set δ1 = ϕ1 =0 .6,δ 2 = ϕ2 =0 .5.Ac o e ﬃcient
of 0.5 on output is consistent with the empirical evidence in Van Den Noord
(2000) and adopted in studies on ﬁscal stabilization (e.g. Westaway, 2003).
We allow for an element of inertia as empirical estimates of ﬁscal policy rules
suggest an important role for an autoregressive term.
5.2 Government spending rules versus Taxation Rules
We now perform some dynamic simulation with our model, closing it by
adding the estimated monetary policy rule and the taxation and government
spending rules in (16) and (15). Rather than assuming a particular form
of welfare loss function, in what follows we consider how the introduction
of a ﬁscal policy rule impacts on output and inﬂation variability (variance
25Andres and Domenech (2003) provide an analysis of how diﬀerent tax measures might
impact on output and inﬂation variability.
26See for instance Bohn (1988) and Taylor (2000a,b). The lack of a debt or deﬁcit
stabilization term raises the issue of whether our ﬁscal rules imply a sustainable path
for government debt. Given that we are not conducting historical simulations with our
estimated models this not a problem, especially for small structural shocks. Obviously
where one wishes to conduct historical or counterfactual simulations (see Muscatelli et al.
2003), then one would need to check whether the implied path for government debt is
sustainable, and closely tracks that observed during the historical period analyzed. In this
paper we will focus instead on dynamic simulations following small shocks and the issue
of debt sustainability is less relevant, providing that we are considering suﬃciently small
shocks. Our ﬁscal rules are close in spirit to those of Taylor (2000a, b), who ﬁnds that
countercyclical ﬁscal policy is almost entirely characterized by the working of automatic
stabilizers.
18frontiers) when it is combined with a monetary policy rule such as (14). Con-
ducting welfare analysis with a NK model such as ours is complex, because
of the presence of heterogeneous consumers (optimisers and rule-of-thumb
consumers)27, but computing variance frontiers allows a certain ranking of
policy rules, where it is apparent that one rule dominates the other in terms
of reducing both output and inﬂation variability.
To construct the variance frontiers we apply a monetary policy rule where
we keep ﬁxed parameters φ2 and φ3 and we allow φ1 to vary28.W et h e nc o m -
pute the standard deviation of output and inﬂation in dynamic simulations
following a shock to the Phillips Curve, and report these “variance frontiers”
in the ﬁgures which follow. The results shown below do not seem to be
too sensitive to small changes in the values of the model parameters, in the
sense of reversing the rank of the various policy rules, and we shall return
to this point below. Figure 4 shows the variance frontiers when the model is
simulated following a temporary 1% inﬂation shock, combining the forward-
looking monetary policy rule with the ﬁscal policy rules in four scenarios:
1. where ﬁscal policy is kept exogenously ﬁxed, i.e. the automatic stabi-
lizers (15) and (16) are kept switched oﬀ (labelled “None”);
2. where only the government spending rule is switched on (labelled “G”);
3. where only the taxation feedback rule is switched on (labelled “T”);
4 .w h e r eb o t hr u l e sa r es w i t c h e do n( l a b e l l e d“ Both”).
T h e r ea r et h r e ep o i n t st on o t ea b o u tt h e s er e s u l t s . T h eﬁrst is that, in
contrast with Muscatelli et al. (2003), automatic stabilizers are no longer
welfare-reducing. In particular, countercyclical taxation policy seems able to
reduce the variance of both output and inﬂation. The second point to note
is that also government spending does not have an unambiguous welfare-
enhancing eﬀect: introducing a feedback rule for government spending tends
27See for instance Benigno and Woodford (2003). We are currently considering the
extension of our modeling framework to include some welfare analysis.
28The variance frontiers are plotted for values of φ1 which vary between between 0.2
and 1.5. The reason for focusing on higher values of φ1 compared to the estimated value
is that it is often argued that estimated monetary policy rules tend to underestimate the
response of the central bank to shifts in expected inﬂation (and conversely overestimate
the degree of inertia) because central banks do not continuously change their monetary
stance.
19to shift the variance frontier, although less than in the previous case, towards
the origin lowering the variability of both output inﬂation. The explanation
for this result lies in the diﬀerent way in which government spending and
taxation operates in the model: government spending varies the proﬁle of
output but its impact is ultimately reversed, as the distributed lag eﬀect sums
to zero. In contrast, taxation has an impact through both the wedge (a level
eﬀect) and through the IS curve (in diﬀerence terms), and this is not reversed
because of its impact on external habits.Third, introducing both automatic
stabilizers is still preferable to having none. In this case the shift in variance
frontier westwards is even more visible suggesting that a combination of both
automatic stabilizers have a much greater impact on the variance frontier.






















To investigate the relative importance of personal taxes relative to payroll
taxes in stabilizing output and inﬂation, we repeated the above experiment
using only personal taxes and then using only payroll taxes. In general we
found that most of the stabilization eﬀect comes from payroll taxes through
their impact on the wedge, especially for cases where φ1 is high. The intuition
for this is straightforward: following an adverse shock to the Phillips curve,
output falls and as payroll taxes fall, they stabilise both inﬂation (through
the wedge eﬀect) and output (through the dispos a b l ei n c o m eo fr u l e - o f - t h u m b
20consumers). In contrast personal taxes act only through the IS curve and
hence stabilise output at the expense of inﬂation stability. Only where φ1
is low, so that the monetary authority reacts less forcefully to the inﬂation
shock, do personal taxes help to stabilise output and inﬂation. In other
words, payroll taxes are generally more complementary to monetary policy
in this model.
6 Fiscal Policy and EMU: A Two-Country
Version of the Euro Model
Given the positive results obtained in the previous sections, the natural ques-
tion is whether one could ﬁnd a role for ﬁscal policy in a two-country version
of the model where shocks and ﬁscal responses are not perfectly symmetric,
and where ﬁscal policy is delegated to national authorities but there is a sin-
gle European Central Bank. Analyzing monetary-ﬁscal policy interactions in
two-country model would require a full paper in itself, and here we can only
begin to highlight some of the issues that one might address.
We then consider a modiﬁed version of this model, which introduces
the debt-channel as an additional channel of transmission for ﬁscal pol-
icy. Whilst retaining the assumption that some consumers follow a ROT
behavior, here we introduce the assumption that optimizing consumers have
Blanchard (1985)-type ﬁnite horizons with a constant probability of death as
in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2004). This removes Ricardian equivalence, and
allows debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal policy to impact, through wealth eﬀects, on the
consumption of optimizing consumers. The introduction of a wealth eﬀect
also introduces a channel of interaction between monetary and ﬁscal pol-
icy, as interest-rate changes will impact on aggregate demand through the
government budget constraint.
In this version of the model all individuals do not expect to live forever
and face a constant probability of death in each period,  .H o w e v e r , a s
before there are two types of consumers. A proportion ϑ of consumers follow
ar u l eo ft h u m b .
The optimizing consumers, making up a proportion (1 − ϑ),n o wb e h a v e
diﬀerently because of the presence of a ﬁnite horizon. Each optimizing con-






















where the notation is the same as above.



























s,t denotes the debt stock and the other variables are deﬁned as be-
fore. Again, we assume that government debt is indexed. For an comparison
of cases where government debt are indexed and non-indexed in a model with
Blanchard-type consumers, see Leith and Wren-Lewis (2004). In this version
of the model we assume the same behavior on the part of ﬁr m sa si nt h e
one-country model.
In the case of the two-country model, stability requires the expenditure
and taxation rules to also respond to the debt stock b bt,t h a ti s :
b gt = δ1b gt−1 − δ2b yt−1 − δ3b bt (19)
b τt = ϕ1b τt−1 + ϕ2b yt−1 + ϕ3b bt (20)
For our baseline case, we set δ1 = ϕ1 =0 .6,δ 2 = ϕ2 =0 .5.Ac o e ﬃcient of 0.5
on output is consistent with the empirical evidence in Van den Noord (2000)
and adopted in studies on ﬁscal stabilization (e.g. Westaway, 2003), and are
broadly consistent with the correlations for US ﬁscal data over the cycle (cf.
Gordon and Leeper, 2003). We allow for an element of inertia as empirical
estimates of ﬁscal policy rules on quarterly data suggest an important role
for an autoregressive term.
The government is assumed to ﬁnance its deﬁcits using indexed bonds.
The debt dynamics are given by a log-linearised version of the standard
government budget constraint (where b rt is the real interest rate, and d gTR
t are
government transfers which are kept constant during our simulations):
























22Our models are simulated under forward-looking (model-consistent) ex-
pectations, where consumers take into account the policy rules and the gov-
ernment budget constraint.
In order to make our results comparable with those in the previous sec-
tions, we then take the simplest possible case and assume that the two coun-
tries are entirely symmetric in terms of structure, so that each has the same
structural parameters as estimated on the Euro-wide data. The detailed
model is outlined in the Appendix.
The model can be parameterized using the same structural parameter
and steady state values as the single Euro-area model. The only caveat is
that the assumed price elasticity of demand θ is quite large, as it is set at 4,
and this implies a rather large relative demand eﬀect within EMU. However,
for most of the shocks considered here the relative depreciation/appreciation
is quite small, so the relative demand eﬀect will not dominate the results.
The other point to note is that equilibrium in asset markets implies that
the sum of domestic and foreign bonds held by consumers in both country
equals the joint supply of bonds provided by each ﬁscal authority. In sim-
ulating the model one could focus on equilibria where, given the absence of
default risk and exchange risk, the debt of each ﬁscal authority grows or
declines over time. To focus instead on a more realistic steady state, which
embodies the type of constraint envisaged in the Maastricht criteria and the
Stability and Growth Pact, we assume that the ﬁscal rule for each country
follows not only a feedback on the output gap and an autoregressive param-
eter, but also has a feedback on deviations of debt from steady state (with
feedback parameters δ3 = ϕ3 =0 .5). This implies that following any shock,
each country will seek to restore its initial level of debt. Given that our model
is in deviations from equilibrium, this is equivalent to the ﬁscal authorities
targeting a given level of the debt-income ratio.
6.1 Fiscal and Monetary Interactions in a Two-Country
Model
In considering asymmetric shocks, we focus on demand and supply shocks
on one of the two EMU countries. The reason for not considering pure
asymmetric shocks (shocks of equal and opposite sign on each EMU country)
is that, given the identical structure of the two countries, and that the ECB
is assumed to target EMU average outcomes, monetary policy will not react
23to such shocks, and there will not be any ﬁscal-monetary policy interactions.
I n s t e a dw ef o c u so nt e m p o r a r ys h o c k st ot h eI Sc u r v ea n dP h i l l i p sc u r v eo f
one of the two EMU countries, using the same format for the shocks as we
have used before.
We plot the outcomes for output in the two countries when the ﬁscal rules
are active and are absent in Figures 5 and 6 following a demand shock to
country 1, and in Figures 7 and 8 following a supply shock to country 1. We
focus solely on output, as the impact of ﬁscal policies through demand on
inﬂation are quite small given the coeﬃcients on outputs and payroll taxes in
the estimated Phillips curve, and any beneﬁts from ﬁscal policy will accrue
largely through output stabilization. This was also apparent from the earlier
single-country simulations following a supply shock.
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Turning ﬁrst to the demand shock, we see that there is a reduction in
output volatility, albeit a small one, whilst in the case of country 2 the initial
impact of the ﬁscal policy is to cause a greater deviation in output from
equilibrium, although convergence is slightly improved. The reasons why in
a two-country setting the value added from ﬁscal policy is less than might
be expected is that we are not considering a pure asymmetric shock, when
the two countries’ ﬁscal policies would be acting in concert and monetary
policy remains inactive. In the single country shock considered here, the
monetary authority reacts to the demand shock by raising interest rates,
thus causing output to fall in country 2. Thus, the two ﬁscal policies will be
acting against each other. In addition, the presence of a feedback term on
debt implies that the increase in interest rates will increase debt ﬁnance and
will partially constrain ﬁs c a lp o l i c yi nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .A sn o t e db yL e i t ha n d
25Wren-Lewis (2004), varying the feedback term on debt in the ﬁscal rule can
have a signiﬁcant impact on the output dynamics in a model with Blanchard-
type consumers.
Turning next to the supply shock in Figures 19 and 20, we can see that
ﬁscal policy has little or no eﬀect on the output dynamics following the
s h o c k .T h em a i nr e a s o nf o rt h i si st h a tt h ep a t ho fo u t p u ti sd o m i n a t e db y
t h er e l a t i v ep r i c ee ﬀect, as country 1’s competitiveness is eroded and country
2’s competitiveness is improved.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has provided a ﬁrst attempt to model monetary-ﬁscal interactions
in a New Keynesian context, in which we have allowed for a much richer
role for ﬁscal policy compared to recent contributions to this literature. This
represents the ﬁrst attempt, to our knowledge, to estimate a NK model which
incorporates liquidity-constrained consumers on Euro area data, and hence
the impact of both government spending and taxation on the New Keynesian
IS and Phillips Curve.
Having estimated this DGE model, we have conducted some preliminary
analysis of the interactions between ﬁscal and monetary policy in such a
model, to provide some understanding of the way in which diﬀerent macroe-
conomic policy instruments interact over the business cycle.
The key conclusions which emerge from our policy analysis is that auto-
matic stabilizers based on taxation policy seem to combine more eﬃciently
with forward-looking inertial monetary policy rules than feedback govern-
ment spending rules. This seems to be largely due to the way in which
taxation (both personal and payroll taxes) enter the model, through the role
played by rule-of-thumb consumers, whose consumption depends on current
disposable income, but whose behaviour impacts on optimising consumers
because of the presence of external habits. This causes the taxation eﬀects
to enter in diﬀerence terms in the IS curve. Interestingly, it also follows
that inertia in ﬁscal rules may be more beneﬁcial in taxation rules than in
government spending rules, and in particular that payroll taxes, which act
both through the tax wedge in the Phillips curve and through the diposable
income of rule-of-thumb consumers, are the most eﬀective ﬁscal stabilisation
instrument.
In the two-country model it becomes apparent that automatic stabilizers
26may, in certain circumstances, oﬀset each other in ways that may limit the
eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy. There is little doubt that ﬁscal stabilizers may
cope reasonably well with the case of a pure asymmetric shock, when mone-
tary policy is eﬀectively inoperative. However, the interactions between ﬁscal
and monetary policy where there is an asymmetric shock which impacts dif-
ferentially on the two countries might hamper the eﬃcacy of ﬁscal policy. In
these cases, the precise design of the feedback rules and the automatic stabi-
lizers becomes important and this should be the subject of further research.
In particular, looking at optimally designed simple rules should improve the
performance of ﬁscal policy against the benchmarks analyzed here.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of IS and Phillips Curve
W eb e g i nw i t ht h ed e ﬁnition of total demand and total consumption:







t deﬁnes the amount of consumption by rule-of-thumb consumers
and CO
t deﬁnes the amount of consumption by optimizing consumers. This
is akin to Galí at al. (2002).














where ϑ deﬁnes the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers. (we assume
that GTR
t − Tt is uniformly spread across consumers).
30We ﬁrst turn to the behavior of optimizing consumers.
From equations (1), (2), (3), assuming that all consumers’ preferences
and their initial holdings of ﬁnancial wealth are identical, the problem can
be solved as a dynamic optimization problem and we can aggregate across



















Taking logs we obtain a ﬁrst order approximation, where we also omit






















t deﬁne the logs of total consumption.
Then, using the equilibrium condition for goods markets, given that we
ignore investment and the external sector, we can loglinearise equation (17)
in the main text




































































Substituting for c cO






































































































To complete the model we want to introduce distortionary taxes. We






the total revenues from the payroll tax. Essentially the payroll tax is divided
equally between the labour force. This means that the optimizing consumer’s



























PR = b t∗ − b n.
Then bearing in mind that
ln(MPL)=l n ( 1− α) − αln(N)
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we can then substitute for
¡
d w − p
¢
into(32) to obtain equation (10).
The derivation of the Phillips Curve for the model structure set out in the
main text is outlined in detailed in Galí et al. (2001) and Leith and Malley
(2002), and will not be reproduced here for reasons of space. The introduction
of the payroll tax, however, changes the deﬁnition of the percentage change
from steady state of the labour cost share, b st. Substituting for
¡
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+b nt − b yt. This yields our modiﬁed
version of the Phillips Curve including the tax wedge (11).
A.2 A Two-country New Keynesian Model
We now extend the model to account for open economy features, assuming
that two countries (Domestic, d, and Foreign, f ) form a monetary union.
Total consumption is still deﬁned as in (5), but only a proportion n∗ of them
is produced in the Home economy. Domestic consumers can now hold their
wealth in domestic (Bd) or foreign (Bf) bonds, denominated in the same




























t (z) deﬁnes the foreign currency price of good (z) and e is the ﬁxed
nominal exchange rate, normalized at 129. Home consumer’s demand for
29Under this assumption Pd = Pf.

























As in Leith and Wren Lewis (2004) we assume that PPP holds for the






















































































































































































































t−1 + βξEtb π
d
t+1
ξ + γ(1 − ξ(1 − β))
+
(1 − γ)(1 − ξ)(1 − γξ)









t−1 + βξEtb π
f
t+1
ξ + γ(1 − ξ(1 − β))
+
(1 − γ)(1 − ξ)(1 − γξ)
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(46)
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